Does changing the encryption password imply rewriting all the data?
up vote
32
down vote
favorite
6
Let's say I have 1 TB of data on a partition encrypted with BitLocker, TrueCrypt or VeraCrypt.
Does changing the encryption password imply rewriting all the data (i.e., will it take hours/days)?
windows encryption bitlocker disk-encryption
edited 11 hours ago
Run5k
10.5k72749
asked yesterday
Basj
655628
add a comment |
up vote
32
down vote
favorite
6
Let's say I have 1 TB of data on a partition encrypted with BitLocker, TrueCrypt or VeraCrypt.
Does changing the encryption password imply rewriting all the data (i.e., will it take hours/days)?
windows encryption bitlocker disk-encryption
edited 11 hours ago
Run5k
10.5k72749
asked yesterday
Basj
655628
For the record: Windows Bitlocker has no procedure to explicitly "rewrite" data. You must decrypt and re-encrypt the disk
– usr-local-ΕΨΗΕΛΩΝ
19 hours ago
1
Related to virtually wiping an entire encrypted disk by just erasing it's key, like some encrypting hard drives can do a nearly instantaneous "wipe" of terabytes
– Xen2050
17 hours ago
2
Related to this (although neither answer mentions it): user-chosen passwords will be both too short, and have terrible entropy (too easily guessable). So the drive is encrypted with a good key... and then the encryption key is protected with a terrible one (ah well).
– Clockwork-Muse
11 hours ago
@Clockwork-Muse Still better than encrypt them with the original short key.
– gvgramazio
10 hours ago
add a comment |
up vote
32
down vote
favorite
6
up vote
32
down vote
favorite
6
6
Let's say I have 1 TB of data on a partition encrypted with BitLocker, TrueCrypt or VeraCrypt.
Does changing the encryption password imply rewriting all the data (i.e., will it take hours/days)?
windows encryption bitlocker disk-encryption
edited 11 hours ago
Run5k
10.5k72749
asked yesterday
Basj
655628
Let's say I have 1 TB of data on a partition encrypted with BitLocker, TrueCrypt or VeraCrypt.
Does changing the encryption password imply rewriting all the data (i.e., will it take hours/days)?
windows encryption bitlocker disk-encryption
windows encryption bitlocker disk-encryption
edited 11 hours ago
Run5k
10.5k72749
asked yesterday
Basj
655628
edited 11 hours ago
Run5k
10.5k72749
asked yesterday
Basj
655628
edited 11 hours ago
Run5k
10.5k72749
edited 11 hours ago
Run5k
10.5k72749
edited 11 hours ago
Run5k
10.5k72749
10.5k72749
asked yesterday
Basj
655628
asked yesterday
Basj
655628
asked yesterday
Basj
655628
655628
For the record: Windows Bitlocker has no procedure to explicitly "rewrite" data. You must decrypt and re-encrypt the disk
– usr-local-ΕΨΗΕΛΩΝ
19 hours ago
1
Related to virtually wiping an entire encrypted disk by just erasing it's key, like some encrypting hard drives can do a nearly instantaneous "wipe" of terabytes
– Xen2050
17 hours ago
2
Related to this (although neither answer mentions it): user-chosen passwords will be both too short, and have terrible entropy (too easily guessable). So the drive is encrypted with a good key... and then the encryption key is protected with a terrible one (ah well).
– Clockwork-Muse
11 hours ago
@Clockwork-Muse Still better than encrypt them with the original short key.
– gvgramazio
10 hours ago
add a comment |
For the record: Windows Bitlocker has no procedure to explicitly "rewrite" data. You must decrypt and re-encrypt the disk
– usr-local-ΕΨΗΕΛΩΝ
19 hours ago
1
Related to virtually wiping an entire encrypted disk by just erasing it's key, like some encrypting hard drives can do a nearly instantaneous "wipe" of terabytes
– Xen2050
17 hours ago
2
Related to this (although neither answer mentions it): user-chosen passwords will be both too short, and have terrible entropy (too easily guessable). So the drive is encrypted with a good key... and then the encryption key is protected with a terrible one (ah well).
– Clockwork-Muse
11 hours ago
@Clockwork-Muse Still better than encrypt them with the original short key.
– gvgramazio
10 hours ago
For the record: Windows Bitlocker has no procedure to explicitly "rewrite" data. You must decrypt and re-encrypt the disk
– usr-local-ΕΨΗΕΛΩΝ
19 hours ago
For the record: Windows Bitlocker has no procedure to explicitly "rewrite" data. You must decrypt and re-encrypt the disk
– usr-local-ΕΨΗΕΛΩΝ
19 hours ago
1
1
Related to virtually wiping an entire encrypted disk by just erasing it's key, like some encrypting hard drives can do a nearly instantaneous "wipe" of terabytes
– Xen2050
17 hours ago
Related to virtually wiping an entire encrypted disk by just erasing it's key, like some encrypting hard drives can do a nearly instantaneous "wipe" of terabytes
– Xen2050
17 hours ago
2
2
Related to this (although neither answer mentions it): user-chosen passwords will be both too short, and have terrible entropy (too easily guessable). So the drive is encrypted with a good key... and then the encryption key is protected with a terrible one (ah well).
– Clockwork-Muse
11 hours ago
Related to this (although neither answer mentions it): user-chosen passwords will be both too short, and have terrible entropy (too easily guessable). So the drive is encrypted with a good key... and then the encryption key is protected with a terrible one (ah well).
– Clockwork-Muse
11 hours ago
@Clockwork-Muse Still better than encrypt them with the original short key.
– gvgramazio
10 hours ago
@Clockwork-Muse Still better than encrypt them with the original short key.
– gvgramazio
10 hours ago
add a comment |
2 Answers
2
active
oldest
votes
up vote
45
down vote
accepted
No. Your password is used to encrypt only the master key. When you change the password, the master key is reencrypted but itself does not change.
(This is how some systems, such as BitLocker or LUKS, are able to have multiple passwords for the same disk: they still use a single master key for all data, but just store multiple copies of the master key encrypted with different passwords.)
answered yesterday
grawity
228k35481540
Thank you very much! Would you have a link with details about that? Is the master key saved (encrypted by password) at the beginning (very first bytes) of the partition?
– Basj
yesterday
1
I don't have any useful links at hand, but see Twisty's answer regarding that.
– grawity
yesterday
1
Then the next question is obvious: is it possible to change the master key?
– gvgramazio
10 hours ago
add a comment |
up vote
24
down vote
Grawity's answer is correct. Because encrypting data is a relatively expensive process, it makes more sense to create a single master key that does not change during the lifetime of the encrypted data. This master key can then in turn be encrypted by one or more secondary keys, which can then be flexibly changed at will.
For example, here's how BitLocker implements this (it actually uses three "layers" of keys):
- Data written to a BitLocker-protected volume is encrypted with a full-volume encryption key (FVEK). This key does not change until BitLocker is completely removed from a volume.
- The FVEK is encrypted with the volume master key (VMK) then stored (in its encrypted form) in the volume's metadata.
- The VMK in turn is encrypted with one or more key protectors, such as a PIN/password.
The following picture shows the process of accessing an encrypted system disk on a machine with BitLocker full volume encryption enabled:
More information about this process can be found on TechNet.
answered yesterday
Twisty Impersonator
17k126093
2
Note: this also means that if anyone inclined enough to get copy of decrypted FVEK while they had (perhaps legitimate) access will continue to have unrestricted access to encrypted data if they come into contact with that encrypted disk, no mater how many times you change your PIN/password/VMK. Which is rather unfortunate (IOW, most times you change your passphrase, you should instead be doing full backup/wipe/recreate with new passphrase/restore cycle manually if you want protection from such cases.)
– Matija Nalis
7 hours ago
Quite true, though for this to be the case one would need either physical access or remote access with administrative rights. If an attacker has either of these...well, enough said.
– Twisty Impersonator
7 hours ago
2
yes, I was thinking physical access. Full disk encryption in irrelevant from security perspective while machine is running and disk is unlocked, anyway. However, it is supposed to protect your sensitive data if machine is off and lost or stolen (think laptop in taxi or airport), tampered with (think maid paid to give access in hotel room while owner is out), or hardware-failed or about to be decommissioned - now you'll still have to do the degaussing, physical shredding and incinerating of hardware instead of just recycling it (or giving to employees or selling on ebay etc)
– Matija Nalis
7 hours ago
@TwistyImpersonator The entire purpose of encrypting a disk is to protect your data when somebody has physical access. So the scenario is not moot; it is the whole point.
– Lightness Races in Orbit
6 hours ago
@LightnessRacesinOrbit I realize that. My comment was made in the context of the suggested vulnerability of the VMK before encryption is complete. In that specific window of time, encryption does not protect against an attacker with physical access or remote admin rights.
– Twisty Impersonator
5 hours ago
add a comment |
2 Answers
2
active
oldest
votes
2 Answers
2
active
oldest
votes
active
oldest
votes
active
oldest
votes
up vote
45
down vote
accepted
No. Your password is used to encrypt only the master key. When you change the password, the master key is reencrypted but itself does not change.
(This is how some systems, such as BitLocker or LUKS, are able to have multiple passwords for the same disk: they still use a single master key for all data, but just store multiple copies of the master key encrypted with different passwords.)
answered yesterday
grawity
228k35481540
Thank you very much! Would you have a link with details about that? Is the master key saved (encrypted by password) at the beginning (very first bytes) of the partition?
– Basj
yesterday
1
I don't have any useful links at hand, but see Twisty's answer regarding that.
– grawity
yesterday
1
Then the next question is obvious: is it possible to change the master key?
– gvgramazio
10 hours ago
add a comment |
up vote
45
down vote
accepted
No. Your password is used to encrypt only the master key. When you change the password, the master key is reencrypted but itself does not change.
(This is how some systems, such as BitLocker or LUKS, are able to have multiple passwords for the same disk: they still use a single master key for all data, but just store multiple copies of the master key encrypted with different passwords.)
answered yesterday
grawity
228k35481540
Thank you very much! Would you have a link with details about that? Is the master key saved (encrypted by password) at the beginning (very first bytes) of the partition?
– Basj
yesterday
1
I don't have any useful links at hand, but see Twisty's answer regarding that.
– grawity
yesterday
1
Then the next question is obvious: is it possible to change the master key?
– gvgramazio
10 hours ago
add a comment |
up vote
45
down vote
accepted
up vote
45
down vote
accepted
No. Your password is used to encrypt only the master key. When you change the password, the master key is reencrypted but itself does not change.
(This is how some systems, such as BitLocker or LUKS, are able to have multiple passwords for the same disk: they still use a single master key for all data, but just store multiple copies of the master key encrypted with different passwords.)
answered yesterday
grawity
228k35481540
No. Your password is used to encrypt only the master key. When you change the password, the master key is reencrypted but itself does not change.
(This is how some systems, such as BitLocker or LUKS, are able to have multiple passwords for the same disk: they still use a single master key for all data, but just store multiple copies of the master key encrypted with different passwords.)
answered yesterday
grawity
228k35481540
edited 22 hours ago
answered yesterday
grawity
228k35481540
answered yesterday
grawity
228k35481540
answered yesterday
grawity
228k35481540
228k35481540
Thank you very much! Would you have a link with details about that? Is the master key saved (encrypted by password) at the beginning (very first bytes) of the partition?
– Basj
yesterday
1
I don't have any useful links at hand, but see Twisty's answer regarding that.
– grawity
yesterday
1
Then the next question is obvious: is it possible to change the master key?
– gvgramazio
10 hours ago
add a comment |
Thank you very much! Would you have a link with details about that? Is the master key saved (encrypted by password) at the beginning (very first bytes) of the partition?
– Basj
yesterday
1
I don't have any useful links at hand, but see Twisty's answer regarding that.
– grawity
yesterday
1
Then the next question is obvious: is it possible to change the master key?
– gvgramazio
10 hours ago
Thank you very much! Would you have a link with details about that? Is the master key saved (encrypted by password) at the beginning (very first bytes) of the partition?
– Basj
yesterday
Thank you very much! Would you have a link with details about that? Is the master key saved (encrypted by password) at the beginning (very first bytes) of the partition?
– Basj
yesterday
1
1
I don't have any useful links at hand, but see Twisty's answer regarding that.
– grawity
yesterday
I don't have any useful links at hand, but see Twisty's answer regarding that.
– grawity
yesterday
1
1
Then the next question is obvious: is it possible to change the master key?
– gvgramazio
10 hours ago
Then the next question is obvious: is it possible to change the master key?
– gvgramazio
10 hours ago
add a comment |
up vote
24
down vote
Grawity's answer is correct. Because encrypting data is a relatively expensive process, it makes more sense to create a single master key that does not change during the lifetime of the encrypted data. This master key can then in turn be encrypted by one or more secondary keys, which can then be flexibly changed at will.
For example, here's how BitLocker implements this (it actually uses three "layers" of keys):
- Data written to a BitLocker-protected volume is encrypted with a full-volume encryption key (FVEK). This key does not change until BitLocker is completely removed from a volume.
- The FVEK is encrypted with the volume master key (VMK) then stored (in its encrypted form) in the volume's metadata.
- The VMK in turn is encrypted with one or more key protectors, such as a PIN/password.
The following picture shows the process of accessing an encrypted system disk on a machine with BitLocker full volume encryption enabled:
More information about this process can be found on TechNet.
answered yesterday
Twisty Impersonator
17k126093
2
Note: this also means that if anyone inclined enough to get copy of decrypted FVEK while they had (perhaps legitimate) access will continue to have unrestricted access to encrypted data if they come into contact with that encrypted disk, no mater how many times you change your PIN/password/VMK. Which is rather unfortunate (IOW, most times you change your passphrase, you should instead be doing full backup/wipe/recreate with new passphrase/restore cycle manually if you want protection from such cases.)
– Matija Nalis
7 hours ago
Quite true, though for this to be the case one would need either physical access or remote access with administrative rights. If an attacker has either of these...well, enough said.
– Twisty Impersonator
7 hours ago
2
yes, I was thinking physical access. Full disk encryption in irrelevant from security perspective while machine is running and disk is unlocked, anyway. However, it is supposed to protect your sensitive data if machine is off and lost or stolen (think laptop in taxi or airport), tampered with (think maid paid to give access in hotel room while owner is out), or hardware-failed or about to be decommissioned - now you'll still have to do the degaussing, physical shredding and incinerating of hardware instead of just recycling it (or giving to employees or selling on ebay etc)
– Matija Nalis
7 hours ago
@TwistyImpersonator The entire purpose of encrypting a disk is to protect your data when somebody has physical access. So the scenario is not moot; it is the whole point.
– Lightness Races in Orbit
6 hours ago
@LightnessRacesinOrbit I realize that. My comment was made in the context of the suggested vulnerability of the VMK before encryption is complete. In that specific window of time, encryption does not protect against an attacker with physical access or remote admin rights.
– Twisty Impersonator
5 hours ago
add a comment |
up vote
24
down vote
Grawity's answer is correct. Because encrypting data is a relatively expensive process, it makes more sense to create a single master key that does not change during the lifetime of the encrypted data. This master key can then in turn be encrypted by one or more secondary keys, which can then be flexibly changed at will.
For example, here's how BitLocker implements this (it actually uses three "layers" of keys):
- Data written to a BitLocker-protected volume is encrypted with a full-volume encryption key (FVEK). This key does not change until BitLocker is completely removed from a volume.
- The FVEK is encrypted with the volume master key (VMK) then stored (in its encrypted form) in the volume's metadata.
- The VMK in turn is encrypted with one or more key protectors, such as a PIN/password.
The following picture shows the process of accessing an encrypted system disk on a machine with BitLocker full volume encryption enabled:
More information about this process can be found on TechNet.
answered yesterday
Twisty Impersonator
17k126093
2
Note: this also means that if anyone inclined enough to get copy of decrypted FVEK while they had (perhaps legitimate) access will continue to have unrestricted access to encrypted data if they come into contact with that encrypted disk, no mater how many times you change your PIN/password/VMK. Which is rather unfortunate (IOW, most times you change your passphrase, you should instead be doing full backup/wipe/recreate with new passphrase/restore cycle manually if you want protection from such cases.)
– Matija Nalis
7 hours ago
Quite true, though for this to be the case one would need either physical access or remote access with administrative rights. If an attacker has either of these...well, enough said.
– Twisty Impersonator
7 hours ago
2
yes, I was thinking physical access. Full disk encryption in irrelevant from security perspective while machine is running and disk is unlocked, anyway. However, it is supposed to protect your sensitive data if machine is off and lost or stolen (think laptop in taxi or airport), tampered with (think maid paid to give access in hotel room while owner is out), or hardware-failed or about to be decommissioned - now you'll still have to do the degaussing, physical shredding and incinerating of hardware instead of just recycling it (or giving to employees or selling on ebay etc)
– Matija Nalis
7 hours ago
@TwistyImpersonator The entire purpose of encrypting a disk is to protect your data when somebody has physical access. So the scenario is not moot; it is the whole point.
– Lightness Races in Orbit
6 hours ago
@LightnessRacesinOrbit I realize that. My comment was made in the context of the suggested vulnerability of the VMK before encryption is complete. In that specific window of time, encryption does not protect against an attacker with physical access or remote admin rights.
– Twisty Impersonator
5 hours ago
add a comment |
up vote
24
down vote
up vote
24
down vote
Grawity's answer is correct. Because encrypting data is a relatively expensive process, it makes more sense to create a single master key that does not change during the lifetime of the encrypted data. This master key can then in turn be encrypted by one or more secondary keys, which can then be flexibly changed at will.
For example, here's how BitLocker implements this (it actually uses three "layers" of keys):
- Data written to a BitLocker-protected volume is encrypted with a full-volume encryption key (FVEK). This key does not change until BitLocker is completely removed from a volume.
- The FVEK is encrypted with the volume master key (VMK) then stored (in its encrypted form) in the volume's metadata.
- The VMK in turn is encrypted with one or more key protectors, such as a PIN/password.
The following picture shows the process of accessing an encrypted system disk on a machine with BitLocker full volume encryption enabled:
More information about this process can be found on TechNet.
answered yesterday
Twisty Impersonator
17k126093
Grawity's answer is correct. Because encrypting data is a relatively expensive process, it makes more sense to create a single master key that does not change during the lifetime of the encrypted data. This master key can then in turn be encrypted by one or more secondary keys, which can then be flexibly changed at will.
For example, here's how BitLocker implements this (it actually uses three "layers" of keys):
- Data written to a BitLocker-protected volume is encrypted with a full-volume encryption key (FVEK). This key does not change until BitLocker is completely removed from a volume.
- The FVEK is encrypted with the volume master key (VMK) then stored (in its encrypted form) in the volume's metadata.
- The VMK in turn is encrypted with one or more key protectors, such as a PIN/password.
The following picture shows the process of accessing an encrypted system disk on a machine with BitLocker full volume encryption enabled:
More information about this process can be found on TechNet.
answered yesterday
Twisty Impersonator
17k126093
edited yesterday
answered yesterday
Twisty Impersonator
17k126093
answered yesterday
Twisty Impersonator
17k126093
answered yesterday
Twisty Impersonator
17k126093
17k126093
2
Note: this also means that if anyone inclined enough to get copy of decrypted FVEK while they had (perhaps legitimate) access will continue to have unrestricted access to encrypted data if they come into contact with that encrypted disk, no mater how many times you change your PIN/password/VMK. Which is rather unfortunate (IOW, most times you change your passphrase, you should instead be doing full backup/wipe/recreate with new passphrase/restore cycle manually if you want protection from such cases.)
– Matija Nalis
7 hours ago
Quite true, though for this to be the case one would need either physical access or remote access with administrative rights. If an attacker has either of these...well, enough said.
– Twisty Impersonator
7 hours ago
2
yes, I was thinking physical access. Full disk encryption in irrelevant from security perspective while machine is running and disk is unlocked, anyway. However, it is supposed to protect your sensitive data if machine is off and lost or stolen (think laptop in taxi or airport), tampered with (think maid paid to give access in hotel room while owner is out), or hardware-failed or about to be decommissioned - now you'll still have to do the degaussing, physical shredding and incinerating of hardware instead of just recycling it (or giving to employees or selling on ebay etc)
– Matija Nalis
7 hours ago
@TwistyImpersonator The entire purpose of encrypting a disk is to protect your data when somebody has physical access. So the scenario is not moot; it is the whole point.
– Lightness Races in Orbit
6 hours ago
@LightnessRacesinOrbit I realize that. My comment was made in the context of the suggested vulnerability of the VMK before encryption is complete. In that specific window of time, encryption does not protect against an attacker with physical access or remote admin rights.
– Twisty Impersonator
5 hours ago
add a comment |
2
Note: this also means that if anyone inclined enough to get copy of decrypted FVEK while they had (perhaps legitimate) access will continue to have unrestricted access to encrypted data if they come into contact with that encrypted disk, no mater how many times you change your PIN/password/VMK. Which is rather unfortunate (IOW, most times you change your passphrase, you should instead be doing full backup/wipe/recreate with new passphrase/restore cycle manually if you want protection from such cases.)
– Matija Nalis
7 hours ago
Quite true, though for this to be the case one would need either physical access or remote access with administrative rights. If an attacker has either of these...well, enough said.
– Twisty Impersonator
7 hours ago
2
yes, I was thinking physical access. Full disk encryption in irrelevant from security perspective while machine is running and disk is unlocked, anyway. However, it is supposed to protect your sensitive data if machine is off and lost or stolen (think laptop in taxi or airport), tampered with (think maid paid to give access in hotel room while owner is out), or hardware-failed or about to be decommissioned - now you'll still have to do the degaussing, physical shredding and incinerating of hardware instead of just recycling it (or giving to employees or selling on ebay etc)
– Matija Nalis
7 hours ago
@TwistyImpersonator The entire purpose of encrypting a disk is to protect your data when somebody has physical access. So the scenario is not moot; it is the whole point.
– Lightness Races in Orbit
6 hours ago
@LightnessRacesinOrbit I realize that. My comment was made in the context of the suggested vulnerability of the VMK before encryption is complete. In that specific window of time, encryption does not protect against an attacker with physical access or remote admin rights.
– Twisty Impersonator
5 hours ago
2
2
Note: this also means that if anyone inclined enough to get copy of decrypted FVEK while they had (perhaps legitimate) access will continue to have unrestricted access to encrypted data if they come into contact with that encrypted disk, no mater how many times you change your PIN/password/VMK. Which is rather unfortunate (IOW, most times you change your passphrase, you should instead be doing full backup/wipe/recreate with new passphrase/restore cycle manually if you want protection from such cases.)
– Matija Nalis
7 hours ago
Note: this also means that if anyone inclined enough to get copy of decrypted FVEK while they had (perhaps legitimate) access will continue to have unrestricted access to encrypted data if they come into contact with that encrypted disk, no mater how many times you change your PIN/password/VMK. Which is rather unfortunate (IOW, most times you change your passphrase, you should instead be doing full backup/wipe/recreate with new passphrase/restore cycle manually if you want protection from such cases.)
– Matija Nalis
7 hours ago
Quite true, though for this to be the case one would need either physical access or remote access with administrative rights. If an attacker has either of these...well, enough said.
– Twisty Impersonator
7 hours ago
Quite true, though for this to be the case one would need either physical access or remote access with administrative rights. If an attacker has either of these...well, enough said.
– Twisty Impersonator
7 hours ago
2
2
yes, I was thinking physical access. Full disk encryption in irrelevant from security perspective while machine is running and disk is unlocked, anyway. However, it is supposed to protect your sensitive data if machine is off and lost or stolen (think laptop in taxi or airport), tampered with (think maid paid to give access in hotel room while owner is out), or hardware-failed or about to be decommissioned - now you'll still have to do the degaussing, physical shredding and incinerating of hardware instead of just recycling it (or giving to employees or selling on ebay etc)
– Matija Nalis
7 hours ago
yes, I was thinking physical access. Full disk encryption in irrelevant from security perspective while machine is running and disk is unlocked, anyway. However, it is supposed to protect your sensitive data if machine is off and lost or stolen (think laptop in taxi or airport), tampered with (think maid paid to give access in hotel room while owner is out), or hardware-failed or about to be decommissioned - now you'll still have to do the degaussing, physical shredding and incinerating of hardware instead of just recycling it (or giving to employees or selling on ebay etc)
– Matija Nalis
7 hours ago
@TwistyImpersonator The entire purpose of encrypting a disk is to protect your data when somebody has physical access. So the scenario is not moot; it is the whole point.
– Lightness Races in Orbit
6 hours ago
@TwistyImpersonator The entire purpose of encrypting a disk is to protect your data when somebody has physical access. So the scenario is not moot; it is the whole point.
– Lightness Races in Orbit
6 hours ago
@LightnessRacesinOrbit I realize that. My comment was made in the context of the suggested vulnerability of the VMK before encryption is complete. In that specific window of time, encryption does not protect against an attacker with physical access or remote admin rights.
– Twisty Impersonator
5 hours ago
@LightnessRacesinOrbit I realize that. My comment was made in the context of the suggested vulnerability of the VMK before encryption is complete. In that specific window of time, encryption does not protect against an attacker with physical access or remote admin rights.
– Twisty Impersonator
5 hours ago
add a comment |
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For the record: Windows Bitlocker has no procedure to explicitly "rewrite" data. You must decrypt and re-encrypt the disk
– usr-local-ΕΨΗΕΛΩΝ
19 hours ago
1
Related to virtually wiping an entire encrypted disk by just erasing it's key, like some encrypting hard drives can do a nearly instantaneous "wipe" of terabytes
– Xen2050
17 hours ago
2
Related to this (although neither answer mentions it): user-chosen passwords will be both too short, and have terrible entropy (too easily guessable). So the drive is encrypted with a good key... and then the encryption key is protected with a terrible one (ah well).
– Clockwork-Muse
11 hours ago
@Clockwork-Muse Still better than encrypt them with the original short key.
– gvgramazio
10 hours ago